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The Proposed Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States: Treaties—Some
Serious Procedural and Substantive Concerns
Leila Nadya Sadat*
INTRODUCTION
The drafting of a new Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign
Relations Law was proposed to the American Law Institute (ALI) in
2012, and the project is now well under way. Multiple preliminary
drafts have been circulated on the topics of Jurisdiction, Sovereign
Immunity, and Treaties, and discussion has begun amongst ALI
Members about the black letter law and commentary they contain.
Because the ultimate adoption of any provisions by the membership of
the ALI will take time, however, and is certainly not a foregone
conclusion, it remains useful to consider at this relatively early stage
whether the project has been well-conceived, and is on the right track.
This Essay will consider the most recent Discussion Draft of April
2015 on the Status of Treaties in United States Law, 1 and not the
tentative drafts on Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity. This brief
examination of the Treaty Draft raises real questions about both the
scope and execution of the Restatement (Fourth) project more
generally. Particularly worrying is the reporters’ decision not to
begin the project with a comprehensive outline of the provisions
they intend to cover, a process issue magnified by some substantive
concerns raised by the content of the proposed Black Letter Law,
Comments, and Reporters’ Notes, many of which are addressed in
other contributions to this Symposium. The present Essay focuses
∗ Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law; Director, Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute,
Washington University School of Law; Special Adviser on Crimes Against Humanity to the
ICC Prosecutor [sadat@wulaw.wustl.edu]. I would like to thank the J. Reuben Clark Law
School at Brigham Young University for the invitation to participate in this Symposium and am
grateful to my colleagues at Washington University School of Law for their helpful comments
and input, particularly Susan Appleton, Stephen Legomsky, Greg Magarian, Adam
Rosenzweig, and Peggie Smith. This essay represents the personal views of the author and does
not represent the official views of any organ of the International Criminal Court.
1. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES §§ 101–106 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
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more upon the structure and probable impact of the project than the
substance of the text, but does question certain substantive choices
made by the drafters, as well as their overall normative approach.
This Essay suggests that it would have been preferable for the
reporters to develop an outline of the entire project before
attempting to draft sections piecemeal. This would render the final
project, and even sections completed along the way, both more
complete and authoritative and would promote greater transparency
about the project as a whole. It could also help in understanding the
relationship between the Restatements (Third) and (Fourth) for the
time period during which they will overlap. This Essay concludes,
perhaps uncomfortably, that if the reporters are unable to do this,
they should reconsider whether it is appropriate to be engaged in the
project at all.
In terms of specific comments, this Essay questions the Discussion
Draft’s narrow scope, and suggests a return to the unitary structure of
Section 111 of the Restatement (Third), rather than the fragmented
approach of the current initiative, which has separated Article II treaties
from all other forms of international law. Because other contributions to
this volume have taken up in detail the discussion of Section 106 (SelfExecuting and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Provisions), this Essay does
not address that issue, although many of the critiques raised in those
contributions echo some of my own concerns. 2
I. HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) PROJECT
In 1987, the American Law Institute published the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 3 This twovolume work was the successor to the 1965 Restatement, and its
Chief Reporter was the late Louis Henkin of Columbia University,
who was assisted by Andreas Lowenfeld, Louis Sohn, and Detlev
Vagts as additional Reporters. 4 The Restatement (Third) is divided
into nine Parts, some of which address questions of international law,
2. See, e.g., David Sloss, Self-Execution in the Restatement (Fourth) on Treaties, 2015
BYU L. REV. 1691 (2016) (arguing that the Reporters have endorsed a novel version of the
doctrine of self-execution that finds little support in current law).
3. Because of a quirk in the labeling of ALI Restatements, the first Restatement of
foreign relations law was actually labeled the second, and the fourth is therefore actually the third.
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
ix (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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others the relationship of international law to U.S. law, and still
others address questions of U.S. domestic law, and more particularly
U.S. Constitutional law. As Geoffrey Hazard, Director of the ALI at
the time of the Restatement (Third)’s publication, noted, many
questions of U.S. foreign relations law raise constitutional questions
involving the independence of the judiciary, “the separation of
powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, the
special constitutional role of the Senate with respect to treaties, and
the federal structure of government.” 5 The Parts addressing
international law questions cover the status of persons, including
recognition of states and governments, succession of states and
international organizations (Part II), the making and scope of
international agreements (Part III), jurisdiction (which also includes
immunities, international cooperation and foreign judgments and
awards) (Part IV), the law of the sea (Part V), the law of the
environment (Part VI), protection of natural and juridical persons,
including human rights law and injury to aliens (Part VII),
international economic relations, covering international trade and
monetary law (Part VIII), and remedies for violations of
international law (Part IX). As completed, the Restatement (Third)
represents the opinion of the ALI as to “the law as it would be
pronounced by a disinterested tribunal, whether of the United States
or some other national state or an international tribunal.” 6
The Restatement (Third) took six years to draft in its entirety. 7 It
was generally well-received when it was published, although it was
not without its critics. 8 According to one observer, controversy
centered largely around the “treatment of customary international
law, expropriation, extraterritorial application of U.S. law, and the act
of state doctrine.” 9 It was broken into five separate tentative drafts,
and because it became very difficult to envisage what the final
product would resemble, the ABA Section on International Law

5. Id. at x.
6. Id. at xi.
7. It was begun in 1978. See John B. Houck, Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (Revised): Issues and Resolutions, 20 INT’L LAW. 1361, 1361 (1986).
See generally Covey T. Oliver, Foreword, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1984). Houck’s essay is
particularly helpful in describing the scope of the disagreements engendered by the draft
documents and the process followed in resolving the disputes.
8. Oliver, supra note 7, at 1–5.
9. Houck, supra note 7, at 1363.
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persuaded, with the help of other interested parties including the
State Department, the ALI to publish a complete new composite
draft in July 1985, which was open for comment until December
2nd. The final draft was brought to the ALI for a final vote by the
Membership in July 1986. 10
The interactive and broad consultations conceded to by the ALI
and the reporters for the Restatement (Third) appear to have
produced an effective compromise text that enjoyed wide support. A
contemporaneous review in the American Journal of International
Law praised the final product as an “extremely important and useful
publication” that “should and will be consulted by lawyers in all
parts of the world.” 11 Another reviewer opined that “the new
Restatement . . . has quickly . . . established a position of paramount
influence, not only on the application of international law by
domestic organs of the United States, but also as a cognitive source
of international law, in general.” 12
Particularly helpful, from an international perspective, was the
reference to comparative law sources in the reporters’ notes and
comments, and their effort to effectively address the interplay of
international law and domestic rules. 13
The reviewers’ predictions were correct: the Restatement (Third)
has been relied upon extensively by U.S., international, and foreign
courts and experts wishing to know what the law is in a particular
area of international law, or regarding the treatment of international
law by the U.S. legal system. According to one author, as of 2010,
the Restatement had been cited by the United States Supreme Court
twenty-two times since it was published and has been cited with
increasing frequency in recent years, especially in “landmark
international law cases” 14 like Sosa, 15 Sanchez Llamas, 16 Boumediene,17

10. Id. at 1364.
11. Rudolf Bernhardt et al., Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 608, 609 (1992)
(reviewing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(AM. LAW INST. 1987)).
12. Matthias Herdegan, Book Review, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 207, 207 (1991) (reviewing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (AM. LAW
INST. 1987)).
13. Id.
14. Oona Hathaway, Professor of Int’l Law, Yale Law School, Remarks at American
Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Mar. 26, 2010), in 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 301, 312 (2010).
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and Medellín. 18 More recently the Court cited it in Kiobel, 19 Bond, 20
and most recently in Zivotofsky v. Kerry. 21
So why a new Restatement, given the authority and popularity of
the existing two-volume work? The idea was floated by a handful of
prominent scholars and then discussed more broadly as more
individuals became involved. Paul Stephan, one of the Co-Reporters
of the current project, criticized the Restatement (Third) in a major
article published in 2003, in which he suggested that the
Restatement’s view on the status of international law as federal law
was no longer appropriate in a post-September 11th world. 22 It was
debated at a panel convened by the American Society of
International Law in 2010, during which some scholars proposed

15. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737 (2004) (using the Restatement as a
baseline for human rights violations with regards to detention); see also id. at 761–62 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (suggesting “that recognition of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited set
of norms is consistent with principles of international comity”).
16. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006) (“An international
agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1)
(AM. LAW INST. 1987))). But see id. passim (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that treaties may
create enforceable rights).
17. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 754 (2008) (quoting Restatement § 206 in
order to establish a definition for sovereignty).
18. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522 (2008) (referencing § 481, comment b, at
595, of the Restatement to argue that foreign judgments awarding injunctive relief “are not
generally entitled to enforcement”); see also id. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Restatement calls “for recognition of judgment rendered after fair hearing in a contested
proceeding before a court with adjudicatory authority over the case”).
19. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670–78 (2013) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (using Restatement §§ 402–404 to argue against the presumption
against extraterritoriality).
20. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2100 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(disagreeing with the broad treaty powers under the Restatement); see also id. at 2103
(Thomas, J., concurring) (contesting the Restatement’s failure to recognize the federal limit
placed on the Treaty Power).
21. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084, 2087 (2015) (“Under the Constitution
of the United States the President has exclusive authority to recognize or not to recognize a
foreign state or government.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 204 (AM. LAW INST. 1987))).
22. Paul B. Stephan, Courts, the Constitution, and Customary International Law: The
Intellectual Origins of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, 44 VA. J. INT’L. L. 33, 60–62 (2003).
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“updating” certain parts of the Restatement, 23 whereas others
suggested that a new Restatement was premature. Oona Hathaway,
who did not favor moving forward, noted that even though it was
getting old, the Restatement (Third) was still widely cited and
viewed as authoritative, and that any new Restatement would be
obliging the ALI to “choose sides on contested points” given the
highly unsettled state of the law. 24 Jide Nzelibe agreed with
Hathaway, but for different reasons: as he noted, the need for “black
letter” rules in public law, rather than “private law” fields seemed
doubtful. 25 He agreed with Hathaway that there were “battle lines”
and a lot of “splits” that would have to be openly acknowledged in
the text and the commentary in order to note the areas of
disagreement, as well as consensus. 26 Barry Carter and David Stewart
argued for a narrow update in the area of jurisdiction, immunities
and related issues, which they felt could be a project that could and
should be taken up. Their paper suggests that the ALI approach this
as a “project” which could have been taken up either as a set of
principles or as an update to the Restatement (Third). 27 It is perhaps
worth noting that international commercial arbitration now has its
own Restatement of the Law, which was published in 2015, to cover
new advances in that field. 28
In 2012, picking up on Stewart and Carter’s suggestion,
Professors Paul Stephan and Sarah Cleveland proposed that the ALI
embark upon a new Restatement on Foreign Relations Law. 29 Unlike

23. David Stewart and Barry Carter proposed a “narrow” update; Oona Hathaway and
Jide Nzelibe suggested that updating the Restatement was premature and “a very fraught
enterprise.” Panel, Updating the Restatement, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 301, 313 (2010).
24. Id. at 312.
25. Id. at 313–14. Nzelibe has a point: most ALI Restatements cover classic private law
areas—contracts, torts, agency, etc.—and it has never to the knowledge of this writer been
suggested that the ALI take on constitutional law as the subject of a Restatement. Given that
foreign relations law is a subset, in part, of U.S. Constitutional law, preparing a Restatement
on the subject is perhaps inherently tendentious, given the often unsettled nature of the law. I
am grateful to my colleague Greg Magarian for making this point as well.
26. Id. at 315.
27. Id. at 307.
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 2015).
29. Proposal from Lance Liebman, Dir. of Am. Law Inst., to Am. Law Inst. Council
(2012) (on file with author) (submitting for council approval a proposal for a Restatement
(Fourth) authored by Paul B. Stephan III and Sarah H. Cleveland) [hereinafter StephanCleveland Proposal].
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the Stewart-Carter proposal, which was relatively modest and based
upon specific case law the authors felt warranted updating certain
provisions of the Restatement, the Stephan-Cleveland proposal was
broad in scope. They wrote that with the end of the Cold War and
the advent of the Internet, we confront issues today that “either did
not exist or were understood very differently at the time of the Third
Restatement’s drafting.” 30 These issues, in their view, include
“terrorism, global warming, failed states, pandemics, international
systemic risk in financial institutions, and digital reproduction of
valuable information . . . .” 31 Moreover, they argued that the old
understandings about international law were about “managing
potential conflicts between states,” rather than “organizing collective
international responses to common problems,” and observed that
questions of international law are more pervasive nowadays with the
advent of globalization than they used to be. 32
The Stephan-Cleveland proposal suggested that a new
Restatement could avoid plunging into “polarized debates” by
breaking the work into small bits and pieces that could, over time,
presumably replace the opus of 1986. 33 The project was approved,
and three areas of study and drafting were proposed for the first
volley in this effort: “Domestic Effect of Treaties,” “Sovereign
Immunity,” and “Jurisdiction.”
What the Cleveland-Stephan proposal did not say, other than the
oblique reference to “polarized debates,” was that foreign relations
law—and particularly the constitutional doctrine that informs U.S.
foreign relations law—has become highly contested and partisan in
the past two decades. Since the 1990s, distinguished scholars have
argued vociferously about the status and force of customary
international law, treaties, and executive agreements as a matter of
U.S. law. Recall, for example, the debate between Larry Tribe and
Bruce Ackerman regarding the constitutionality (or not) of NAFTA,
a congressional-executive agreement; 34 and the revisionist view put
forth by Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith in Customary
30. Id. at 1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1–2.
34. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
799 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
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International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, arguing that it was unconstitutional for the federal
courts to consider customary international law as federal law because
the Erie case forbade it. 35 This latter assertion prompted forceful
responses from Gerry Neuman, 36 Bill Dodge, 37 and Harold Koh,38
among others. 39
Indeed, foreign affairs has become a polarized field, in which the split
on the Supreme Court between so-called “liberal” and “conservative”
Justices has played out in important cases such as Sosa v. AlvarezMachain,40 Medellín v. Texas,41 and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.42
Medellín was perhaps the most stunning of the three cases abovecited, given that six members of the Court decided that the
President of the United States could not order compliance with a
decision of the International Court of Justice finding the United
States in noncompliance of its international obligations under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations because of the non-selfexecuting nature of the relevant treaties at issue (in the majority’s
view). It continues to provoke scholarly debate, 43 particularly given
the somewhat opaque reasoning of the Supreme Court and the
majority’s failure to adequately examine the self-executing nature of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the principal treaty at
issue in the case. 44

35. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); see also
Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law,
and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007).
36. Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A
Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997).
37. William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy,
120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2007).
38. Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998).
39. For a good analysis of the debate about the status of Article II versus Article I
treaties, see John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and
International Bargaining, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2011).
40. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
41. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
42. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
43. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Medellín’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation,
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (2008).
44. Sloss, supra note 2.
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Read against this background, the effort to restate U.S. foreign
relations law, particularly as regards the status of treaties in U.S. law,
seems somewhat naïve, as the law appears to most observers to be
highly contested and in flux. The American Law Institute does not
produce Restatements very often. In fact, there are no “Restatement
Fourths” published in any field to date. Moreover, the decision to
take up the question of “Treaties” is highly fraught, for, unlike
questions of jurisdiction and immunities, for which there have been
many cases, there are few recent decisions on the question of treaties,
and the question of a treaty’s status as U.S. law raises profound
questions of constitutional law and federalist concerns. Had the
“project” been limited to consideration of jurisdiction and
immunities it might have been less objectionable. Or, conversely, had
it taken up new subjects in international law not well-addressed in
the Restatement (Third), it would have had the advantage of
providing clearer legal frameworks in some of the difficult areas of
international law that have evolved since 1985. But it did neither.
Instead, by taking on the status of treaties in U.S. law—particularly
without regard to consideration of the status of customary
international law, executive agreements and congressional-executive
agreements at the same time—it ventured into one of the most
fractious areas of U.S. foreign relations law. This seems problematic
as a matter of process, and unlikely to lead to a positive result in
terms of substance.
II. TWO SPECIFIC CRITIQUES OF THE APRIL DISCUSSION DRAFT
In reading the April Discussion Draft, one has the sense that it is
an effort to take a few recent Supreme Court cases—such as
Medellín—that have benefited the revisionist view and codify them
quickly, rather than to comprehensively “restate” U.S. foreign
relations law. Indeed, it leaves the reader completely at a loss
regarding the status of customary international law and other forms
of international agreements in the U.S. legal system, although
presumably the Restatement (Third) would continue to apply to
them. This is compounded by the fact that there is no stated
explanation of why the reporters decided to separate the work on
Article II treaties from all other forms of international agreements. It
seems particularly odd given that the Restatement (Third) and the
United States’ courts do not take this approach, meaning, in my
view, that it is instead a policy preference of the reporters.
1681
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Recall that in the Restatement (Third), there were just a few
black letter law provisions addressing “international agreements”
which did not distinguish between Article II treaties and other
international agreements. Section 111(1) of the Restatement
(Third) provides:
§ 111. International Law and Agreements as Law of the
United States
International law and international agreements of the United States
are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the
several States. 45

This provision aligns U.S. foreign relations practice with
international law, because regardless of the domestic manner in
which a State chooses to ratify its international agreements, they are
all “treaties” internationally, governed by the rules of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and give rise to binding legal
obligations on the international plane.
Conversely, Section 101(1) of the proposed Restatement
(Fourth) provides:
§ 101. Treaties as Law of the United States
(1) Treaties made under the authority of the United States are part
of the supreme law of the land.
(2) Cases arising under treaties fall within the judicial power of the
federal courts, and treaties are binding on state judges.

(3) Treaties create binding international legal obligations for the
United States, and limitations on the domestic enforceability of
treaties do not alter the United States’ obligation under
international law to comply with relevant treaty provisions. 46

The comment to draft Section 101 states that “[u]nless
otherwise indicated, the term ‘treaty’ in this Restatement concerns
only ‘Article II treaties’—that is, international agreements entered
into by the United States pursuant to the process specified in Article
II of the Constitution.” What about other forms of international
agreements? The comment states that they “will be addressed in
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
46. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 101 at 1 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
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another Section of this Restatement.” This is an improvement over
the prior draft, which was completely silent on this question, but
since the ALI has not yet approved taking up any other sections, and
the reporters have yet to produce a comprehensive outline of the
proposed Restatement (Fourth), it is not clear how or when that
might be accomplished.
As it stands, however, draft Section 101 would not apply to
NAFTA nor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the
GATT)—two major international agreements adopted as executive
agreements, not as Article II treaties. Presumably some other, as yet
unwritten sections of the proposed Restatement will do so, and
during the meeting that led to the papers in this volume, it was
pointed out that many of the sections on Article II treaties could be
applied to other forms of international agreements, mutatis
mutandis, even though they have been deleted from draft Sections
101(1) and (2).
At the same time, this is not entirely reassuring. Congress has
long treated the word “treaty” as meaning both executive
agreements and Article II treaties, such as in the Tariff Act of 1897,
which the Court recognized in B. Altman & Co. v. United States. 47
International law treats all kinds of agreements as “treaties,” and this
has consistently been the case in federal courts as well. So why have
the reporters taken a different view? Is it that they do not believe
that non-Article II international agreements are within the ambit of
the Supremacy Clause? Or have been unconstitutionally adopted?
Why have they been eliminated from the scope of Section 101? The
April Discussion Draft is silent, leaving one to speculate. This worry
is not just a law professor’s hypothetical, but may have real-world
implications. To take one recent example, the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action negotiated between Iran and China, the European
Union, France, Germany, Russia, the United States and the United
Kingdom, entered into in Vienna on July 14, 2015, has been
attacked (including by an author in this symposium) as
unconstitutional because it was not entered into with the advice and
consent of the Senate as an “Article II” treaty. 48 Other scholars have

47. 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
48. Michael Ramsey, Is the Iran Deal Unconstitutional?, ORIGINALISM BLOG (July 15,
2015), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2015/07/is-the-iran-dealunconstitutionalmichael-ramsey.html.
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disagreed, of course, 49 and Hathaway herself has suggested that
treaties can be adopted under either Article II or Article I, without
regard to the subject matter at issue. 50 Even assuming it to be
constitutional as adopted, the drafters of the Restatement (Fourth)
may be suggesting that it would not have the same status as U.S. law
as it would have had if negotiated as an Article II treaty. 51 For if it
does not matter whether an international agreement is entered into
using a process set forth in Article II rather than Article I of the U.S.
Constitution, why limit Section 101’s scope and application? At the
very least, this difficult question of politics, policies, constitutional
law, and foreign affairs has been largely avoided heretofore by the
courts. For the proposed Restatement to suggest that a black letter
rule can be developed in this area seems to prove too much.
Even if the omission of non-Article II treaties from Section 101
was not intended to cast doubt upon their ultimate constitutionality
or their status as “the supreme law of the land,” omitting them from
the ambit of Section 101 casts doubt upon their status as such, given
that the coordinating reporters have not published a complete
program of work for the Restatement (Fourth). To complicate and
confuse the effects of Article II treaties and international agreements
domestically by segregating them out into different sections in this
way seems odd given that the coordinating reporters have suggested
that the overarching goal of the project is to help solve complex
international problems. Indeed, the decision to separate Article II
treaties from other forms of international agreements entered into by
the United States seems likely to produce a fractured and complex
product that will neither assist the non-specialist in the field nor
49. See Julian Ku, Why the Iran Deal is Constitutional, But Could Still End up in U.S.
Court, OPINIO JURIS (July 31, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/07/31/podcast-specialwhy-the-iran-deal-is-constitutional-but-could-still-end-up-in-u-s-court/.
50. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L. J. 1236 (2008).
51. They may not be suggesting this, but since they have offered no reason to depart
from the unitary provision of Section 111 of the Third Restatement, we have to guess at why
they have decided to sever out Article II treaties from other sources of international law. It is
hard not to assume that it represents an intentional departure from what I call the Henkin
“unitary model”—and it is worth noting that Henkin himself wrote that “it is now widely
accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general
use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty.” LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 217 (2d ed. 1996) (footnote omitted). The Third
Restatement also takes this view. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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promote the globalization agenda evoked by the coordinating
reporters in the project description.
As is well known, there have been thousands of executive
agreements and congressional-executive agreements entered into
since the founding. A study in 1997 found that between 1980 and
1992, some 4510 new executive agreements were made against only
218 treaties that received the advice and consent of the Senate. 52 A
more recent study reports that from 1980 to 2000 the United States
made 2744 congressional-executive agreements and only 375 treaties
(under Article II). 53 They have also been treated by the federal courts
as entirely interchangeable with Article II treaties, as shown by the
Belmont, 54 Pink, 55 and Dames & Moore 56 decisions. 57 In American
Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, the Court found that an executive
agreement preempted contradictory state law. 58 It has become
understood that executive agreements are appropriate vehicles for
entering into international agreements outside the mechanism of
Article II as a result of long-accepted and unbroken practice. 59 Of
course, as noted earlier, 60 one of the most difficult questions has
been when it may be constitutionally required to use the Article II
process, rather than another vehicle; the courts have refused to
answer this question virtually every time it has been raised: where the
case has proceeded to the merits, the court found the executive
agreement to be valid. 61 This is perhaps why the Restatement (Third)

52. Detlev F. Vagts, International Agreements, the Senate and the Constitution, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 145 (1997).
53. Hathaway, supra note 50, at 1258–60.
54. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
55. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
56. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
57. For a good discussion of the rise of the Executive Agreement as a source of “treaty”
law in the United States, see Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1901-1945,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 191
(David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011).
58. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416–17 (2003).
59. Dames, 453 U.S. at 657.
60. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
61. E.g., Dole v. Carter, 444 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Kan. 1977). On appeal, however, the
Tenth Circuit did not address the merits and instead overturned the district court’s finding
that the subject matter was not a non-justiciable controversy. Dole v. Carter, 569 F.2d 1109,
1110–11 (10th Cir. 1977).
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takes the view that they are interchangeable. 62 Scholars, of course,
have argued that the courts are wrong, as noted above.
Because the courts have never distinguished Article II treaties
from other forms of international agreements entered into by the
United States, many—if not most—of the cases referred to in the
comments or reporters’ notes to Preliminary Draft No. 3 involve
international agreements which are not Article II treaties. For
example, there are long citations to Reid v. Covert in the comment
to draft Section 103, regarding the proposition that a treaty may not
trump individual constitutional rights. 63 It is the principal case cited;
but as the reporters’ notes make clear, the international agreements
at issue in Reid were executive agreements, not Article II treaties. If
Reid is deleted from the commentary to proposed Section 103 of
the Preliminary Draft, there is not much to “restate,” and the
section becomes a great deal weaker.
Section 104 of the Preliminary Draft is perhaps even more
problematic: it says “Treaties” are supreme over state and local law,
but it is silent about other international agreements (although cases
involving other international agreements are cited, such as Pink and
Garamendi, and the notes indicate that “[t]he Supreme Court
has . . . applied the Supremacy Clause to displace the application of
State and local laws that would conflict with sole executive
agreements”). 64 This suggests that the black letter text of Section
104 should be changed. The comment to this Section, like the
comment to Section 103, refers to the supremacy of executive
agreements. 65 Moreover, the reporters’ notes also refer to several
cases involving not Article II treaties, but other international
agreements, for the proposition that “treaty provisions” have been
regularly enforced by state and lower federal courts over contrary
state or local law. 66
In other words, one does not find a bifurcated world in the case
law, in which Article II treaties stand clearly on one side of a

62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 303 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST., 1987).
63. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 103 cmt. c at 10 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2014).
64. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 104 reporters’ note 1 at 18 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
65. Id. § 104 cmt. c at 16 (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)).
66. Id. § 104 reporters’ note 1 at 17.
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constitutional line subject to one regime and other international
agreements stand clearly on the opposite side, subject to a different
set of rules; rather, there is a unitary system of treatment of all
international agreements under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution. This is a felicitous result: under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 67 States are not required to
investigate the constitutional processes involved in other States’
manifestations of consent to be bound on the international plane.
III. THE GLOBALIZATION PROBLEM POSED BY THE
PROPOSED RESTATEMENT
I would like to conclude by returning to the transnationalist
perspective evoked by the Stephan-Cleveland proposal. Recall that
the premise of their project was that the world had changed since
1985 and, therefore, we needed better tools to address international
problems arising from globalization. My critique of the April
Discussion Draft thus far has largely been that it misleads the reader
regarding the status of international law in U.S. courts by creating an
artificial distinction between Article II treaties and everything else. I
have suggested an easy fix: return to the unitary formulation of the
Restatement (Third).
My second major critique is that the proposed deconstruction
and partial reconstruction of the Restatement (Third) is simply too
complex to achieve the objectives of the reporters. The most
effective way to make international law enforceable is to domesticate
it. National legal systems are much more robust than international
courts and tribunals in their ability to enforce and apply international
legal norms. 68 To the extent that the proposed new Restatement
makes it more difficult to incorporate and apply international law
norms in U.S. courts, which seems likely to be its impact (if not its
objective), it will arguably undercut the goals articulated in the
proposal submitted to the American Law Institute, which was
premised on the need for increased international cooperation and
crisis management due to the pressures of globalization.

67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 46, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331; see also Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria), 2002 I.C.J. 303, 428–30 (Oct. 10).
68. Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV.
623 (1998).
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The Preliminary Draft, by separating Article II treaties from
everything else—customary international law and executive
agreements—implicitly makes it more difficult, not less, to
understand and therefore to use international law in the U.S. legal
system. The audience for this Restatement is not just U.S. lawyers,
judges, academics and diplomats, but foreign lawyers, judges,
academics, and diplomats seeking to understand U.S. practice. The
Restatement (Third) has been influential not only in the United
States, but also abroad (as the Stephan-Cleveland proposal
observes) 69 and has often been cited by international courts and
tribunals. 70 Producing a confusing or tendentious Restatement
(Fourth) could constrain, rather than promote, the ability of the
United States to participate in international agreements to manage
international problems. If a nation is unable to state clearly that its
international commitments are binding and enforceable within its
borders, it will be less, not more likely, to be able to negotiate
effectively in international fora.

69. Stephan-Cleveland Proposal, supra note 29, at 1.
70. Australian Sec. Comm’n v Bank Leumi Le-Israel [1995] FCA 1744 [para. 126]
(Austl.) (citing § 402(1)(c) of the Third Restatement to support the notion that prescriptive
jurisdiction may be exercised, with respect to conduct outside the United States, if the conduct
has a “substantial effect” within the United States); R v Truong, [2002] VSCA 27 [para. 74]
(Austl.) (explaining that while the doctrine of specialty is not explicitly stated in an extradition
treaty the court will imply that such a principle applies, following §477 of the Third
Restatement); Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc. [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, para. 39 (Can.) (finding
that contempt orders should not be enforceable in Canada pursuant to the approach outlined
in § 481 of the Third Restatement); R. v. Dorsay, 2003 BCSC 1934, para. 24, (Can. B.C.)
(Third Restatement is an authoritative work in obtaining evidence in or for use in foreign
state); R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte No. 1), [2000] 1
A.C. 61 (H.L.) [117] (appeal taken from Q.B.) (U.K.) (endorsing the Third Restatement view
regarding the relationship between human rights violations and the act of state doctrine); R v.
Sec’y of State for Def. [2010] UKSC 29 [para. 167] (appeal taken from E.W.C.A. Civ.) (U.K.)
(citing the Third Restatement when discussing jurisdiction in general international law); Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, para. 51 (Van den
Wyngaert, J., dissenting) (citing the Third Restatement on the question of jurisdiction);
Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1 (Dec. 16, 2002), 7 ICSID Rev. 341,
524 (2003) (relying upon the Third Restatement regarding a question of expropriation);
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Interim Award of 26 June 2000, para. 102
(relying upon the Restatement regarding a question of compensation in considering whether a
regulation may be considered an expropriation).
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IV. CONCLUSION
As the saying goes, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” and the first
principle of any effort to undertake a Restatement (Fourth) of the
Foreign Relations Law should be to do no harm. The April
Discussion Draft on the status of Treaties violates both of these rules.
Section 111 of the Restatement (Third) was clear and consistent with
U.S. case law. Section 101 of the proposed Restatement (Fourth) is
neither. As Section II, above, noted, the debate that accompanied
the elaboration and publication of the Restatement (Third) was
extensive and involved. Many government agencies weighed in with
the ALI, requesting a comprehensive look at the entire proposed
draft—as opposed to bits and pieces—and submitted extensive
comments as well. The resulting product was a consensus document
that has stood the test of time, and continues to be cited by the U.S.
Supreme Court and international courts and tribunals. Admittedly, it
does not address some of the contentious constitutional issues
touched upon in the Discussion Draft for the Restatement (Fourth),
leaving some of those difficult questions to resolution by the courts,
and leaving some of the inter-branch debates to be resolved by the
political and judicial processes over time, and in specific situations.
The attempt to “restate” some of these difficult areas of
constitutional law in the Discussion Draft seems both artificial
and unhelpful.
Of course, it is to be expected that any revision will provoke
debate, and the debate itself is not a reason to shy away from the
process of updating and revising if it is truly necessary. While there
are not yet many comments posted to the ALI website concerning
the Discussion Draft, it is starting to attract discussion—as this
Symposium shows. Michael Mattler, Assistant Legal Adviser for
Treaty Affairs with the U.S. Department of State, has already sent
extensive comments to the reporters, expressing concerns with
several of the proposed provisions, and debate amongst the
participants in this symposium was extensive. It is clear that this part
of the proposed Restatement (Fourth), on the status of treaties as
U.S. law, is likely to continue to provoke active—and sometimes
tendentious—discussions; and it is to be hoped that the reporters—
and the leadership of the ALI—will take note. As for this author, it is
difficult to be supportive of this project as currently conceived.
Proposing a chapter on the status of Article II treaties in U.S. law—
without mention of the other sources of international law—seems
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illogical. Surely the first step in undertaking a major work, such as
the drafting of a new Restatement, is to prepare a comprehensive
outline of the proposed volume envisaged. It is inconceivable that
the membership of the ALI—and other concerned constituencies—
could be expected to adopt, piecemeal, bits and pieces of a project
whose final contours are yet unknown. One hopes that future drafts
will include a proposed work plan, and set forth the rationale for
proposing the structure adopted. For now, however, it looks like the
reporters have simply decided to enter into the scholarly debate (and
preferred one side of that debate) while minimizing the import of
the case law. Hopefully, future revisions will correct this imbalance.
Otherwise, this part of the Restatement (Fourth) project, at least,
should be abandoned.
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